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The Ukraine crisis dramatically raised the proﬁle of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), with the OSCE playing a role in discussions between Russia, Europe and the
United States. It also provided an opportunity for the organisation to demonstrate its continued
relevance to European security, forty years after the signing of the so called ‘Helsinki Final Act’ in
1975, which served as the foundation for the establishment of the OSCE. Martin D. Brown and
Angela Romano provide an overview of the signiﬁcance of the Final Act, its original aims and how
its contents shaped future security developments up to the present day.
The fortieth anniversary of the signing of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), concluded in Helsinki, was marked on 1 August. The CSCE is not
simply of interest to historians; recent events in Ukraine and the Russian Federation’s annexation of
Crimea have brought this relatively obscure Cold War relic back into the headlines.
After Helsinki, ﬁve follow-up conferences were held creating a ‘CSCE process’. At the 1994 meeting
in Budapest the CSCE morphed into the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE). They also produced the Budapest Memorandum, which deﬁned Ukraine’s newly established frontiers that
Moscow is now accused of violating.
Today the OSCE remains one of the few forums for communication between Europe, the US, and the Russian
Federation. Some even suggest that a ‘Helsinki 2.0’ is now required. But what were the original circumstances
behind the creation of the Final Act and how does this history impact upon its role today?
The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: who, when and where?
Thirty-ﬁve states participated in the negotiations: all of Europe expect Albania and Andorra, but including the
Vatican, Liechtenstein, and San Marino, plus the Soviet Union, the United States, and Canada. The superpowers
were preeminent players, but by no means the most signiﬁcant. Much more inﬂuential were the nine members of the
European Community. Also pro-active was the informal group of neutral countries such as Austria, Switzerland, and
non-aligned Yugoslavia.
The Final Act was signed in the Finlandia Hall in Helsinki, at a summit convened from 30 July to 1 August 1975; a
grand ceremonial occasion for state leaders, following three years of gruelling diplomatic negotiations. From 22
November 1972 to 8 June 1973 delegations met to set the rules and agenda for the CSCE. The ﬁrst phase took
place in Helsinki from 3 to 7 July 1973, at ministerial level. Then, on 18 September 1973, more than 600 delegates
and experts descended on Geneva for the second phase – the negotiations.
It had taken two decades for the concept of a CSCE to gain traction. In the absence of a peace treaty following the
Second World War, the USSR had repeatedly asked for a European security conference to be convened. But it was
only with the emergence of détente in the late 1960s that a pan-European gathering was considered viable.
The Warsaw Pact asked for a conference on 17 March 1969. NATO accepted the idea on 5 December 1969, but set
some preliminary conditions: a successful conclusion of the Ostpolitik treaties, a quadripartite agreement on the
status of Berlin, and the start of negotiations on conventional force reductions in Europe (MBFR).
What was agreed?
1/3
OSCE Secretary General Spencer Oliver in July 2015, Credit: OSCE (CC-BY-
SA-3.0)
If these crucial issues were dealt with in advance,
what exactly did the CSCE agree upon? The Helsinki
Final Act is a non-legally binding international
agreement that comprises three main sets (‘baskets’)
of recommendations.
The ﬁrst ‘basket’ was the Declaration of Principles
Guiding Relations between participating States
(known as the ‘Helsinki Decalogue) including the all-
important Principle VII on human rights and
fundamental freedoms; a section on conﬁdence-
building measures and other aspects of security. The
second basket comprised economic, scientiﬁc,
technological, and environmental cooperation. Finally
the third basket, later referred to as the ‘Human
Rights basket’, consisted of cooperation in
humanitarian and other ﬁelds, i.e. freer movement of
people and cultural and educational exchanges.
Principle VII and Basket III together have come to be
known as “The Human Dimension” of the Helsinki accords, with human rights becoming increasingly important
during the 1970s.
By agreement the Final Act was translated and published domestically by all participants. Much of the western
media reported the Final Act as a Soviet victory, in particular on territorial issues, Poland’s borders, annexation of
the Baltic coast, and recognition of East Germany. Western governments were blamed for their concessions made
in exchange of mere declarations of goodwill on human contacts. However, by December 1972 all borders had been
recognised in legally binding bilateral treaties and mutual recognition. In fact, the Final Act aﬃrmed the inviolability of
frontiers, not their immutability; and featured a (West-conceived) speciﬁc clause on peaceful change.
Nor did the Final Act legitimise the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe; on the contrary, the Decalogue amounted to a
clear rejection of the Brezhnev doctrine. Moreover, the Final Act adopted the Western thesis upon which détente
was not merely a question of good relations between states, but granted beneﬁts to individuals. The Final Act gave
both states and citizens legitimacy to claim the modiﬁcation of certain governmental practices. This provision was an
innovation of international law, asserting the idea that the way states treat their citizens was now a matter of
international jurisdiction.
Why?
Discussion about who gained most from the CSCE invariable starts from questioning why the CSCE was convened.
Quite evidently the USSR’s main goal at the conference was gaining legitimisation of its post-1945 territorial
enlargements and its sphere of inﬂuence. The Nixon administration agreed, it had little interest in the CSCE and
regarded it as a mere bargaining chip in wider bilateral negotiations with Moscow.
Historians now agree that détente between the superpowers diﬀered from, and often conﬂicted with, détente
between Western Europe and the Socialist bloc. The former aimed at stabilising the continent in the bipolar partition,
the latter hoped to overcome the Cold War by deepening mutual interdependence between the two halves of the
continent.
Western Europe’s goal at the CSCE was to promote the idea that economic cooperation and more frequent contacts
among individuals across the Continent were necessary to improve relations among states, and to agree on
practical provisions to make it happen. This would then change European order gradually.
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Close reading of the Final Act reveals that it is imbued with these Western European ideas. Rather than crystallising
the status quo, it was both the symbol of and a step towards changing the status quo in Europe. While the Helsinki
Final Act did not directly help ‘win’ or end the Cold War, it probably made its peaceful resolution far more likely.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
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